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MUSLIM MINORITIES AND SELF-RESTRAINT
IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
Khaled Abou El Fadl*
Islam embodies a comprehensive view for the Herein and
Hereafter. It is often stated that Islamic theology and law regulates
every aspect of a Muslim's life.' Islamic law is comprehensive and
sacred; yet, it is not irrational. Islamic law was not created through
an irrational process of divine revelation; rather, it was deduced from
principles and moral rules extracted from texts believed to be divine.
The process seeks to discover the will of God in this life and the
Hereafter. Divine command compels the drive to discover the divine
will. The Qur'an,the divine book of Islam, states: "And those who
do not judge by God's revelations are unjust."2
The Qur'an contains only a few specific legal injunctions. For the
most part it expounds comprehensive moral organizing principles.
Most of the legal rules of Islam are extracted from the reported
practices (the Sunna) of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, and his
oral injunctions (the Hadith). The Qur'an and Sunna constitute the
source of divinity in Islamic law. A Muslim jurist, using a variety of
jurisprudential methods and legal principles, searches for the divine
will in these two sources. This search is called ijtihad (striving) and the
result of this search produces a rule of fiqh (literally, understanding)?
The enormous corpus of Islamic law is generally called fiqh. But the

* I would like to thank my wife Grace for all her help, Waheed Hussein for his
many insights, and all the participants in my unscientific survey of Muslim views. I thank
Professor Kurt T. Lash for forcing me to exhaust my reservoir of excuses and come on
board for this unique project.
1. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCrION TO ISLAMIC LAW 1-5 (1964). Incidentally,
I disagree with this view.
2. THE QUR'AN 5:45 [hereinafter QUR'AN]. I altered some of the quoted translations
throughout this Essay to reflect my sense of the original. All translations are inspired by
Ahmed Ali, Al-Qur'an. These verses and others command Jews, Christians, and Muslims
to govern themselves by their respective revelations. Id. at 5:44.
3. See generally MOHAMMAD H. KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE
366-92 (1991) (discussing the underlying principal of Islamic law); SOBHI MAHMASSANI,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN ISLAM (Farhat Ziadeh trans., 1987) (discussing

the philosophy of Islamic jurisprudence).
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principles and Qur'anic injunctions as well as the rules of fiqh are
given the all-inclusive name Sharia (literally, the way).
Throughout history Muslim discourses have emphasized the
unwavering obligation of all Muslims to live by the dictates of Sharia
(God's law). Joseph Schacht, the well-known orientalist, gives us a
sense of the centrality of Sharia discourses in Muslim life when he
states: "Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, the most
typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of
Islam itself."'4 In this famous and lengthy passage, the Muslim jurist
Muhammad Ibn Qayyim (d. 751/1350-51) conveys a sense of the
reverence and adoration with which the Sharia was held in Islamic
history. He states:
The Sharia is God's justice among His servants, and His
mercy among His creatures. It is God's shadow on this
earth. It is His wisdom which leads to Him in the most
exact way and the most exact affirmation of the truthfulness
of His Prophet. It is His light which enlightens the seekers
and His guidance for the rightly guided. It is the absolute
cure for all ills and the straight path which if followed will
lead to righteousness . .

.

. It is life and nutrition, the

medicine, the light, the cure and the safeguard. Every good
in this life is derived from it and achieved through it, and
every deficiency in existence results from its dissipation. If
it had not been for the fact that some of its rules remain [in
this world] this world would become corrupted and the
universe would be dissipated .... If God would wish to
destroy the world and dissolve existence, He would void
whatever remains of its injunctions. For the Sharia which
was sent to His Prophet... is the pillar of existence and the
key to success in this world and the Hereafter.'
Ibn Qayyim's language is more colorful than most but its essential
message is by no means unusual in Muslim discourses. The Sharia
should guide and inspire every Muslim.
Nevertheless, there is no formal church in Islam. No single
institution can formulate a single comprehensive view for all Muslims
to adopt. Every Muslim must discharge God's covenant by living
4. SCHACHT, supra note 1, at 1. Although Schacht uses the expression "Islamic law,"
he means Sharia.
5. 3 MUHAMMAD IBN QAYYIM, A'LAM AL-MUWAQQI'IN 3 (this is my translation of

the original).
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according to his or her personal understanding of the Sharia. Yet,
personal individual understandings cannot be entirely autonomous.
There are two main restrictions. First, the personal understanding
must be consciously and reflectively held. The individual may not
adhere to a position without full awareness of its evidentiary basis and
its consequences. Second, the individually held position must engage
and, at times, yield to a consensus-building process called ijma'. In
that sense, orthodoxy in Islam develops through a process of
consensus building in Islamic society.
The Islamic civilization has produced a large number of Islamic
theological and legal schools emphasizing a variety of Sharia-based
comprehensive views. Most of these schools have become extinct, but
through the process of consensus building a few survived into the
contemporary age. In the Sunni world, the main schools are the
Shafi'ites, the Hanafites, the Malikites, and the Hanbalites. Additionally, several schools emerged in the contemporary age such as the
Wahabis of Saudi Arabia and the synchronist school of the Salafis.
In the Shi'ite world, three schools, the Ja'faris, the Isma'ilis, and the
Zaydis, survived into the contemporary age. Furthermore, there is
the Kharajite Ibadi school which predominates in Oman.6
The main discoursive mechanism for consensus building is the
duty to enjoin the good and forbid the bad. The Qur'andescribes the
truly pious as those who "enjoin the good and forbid the bad and
maintain the limits of God."7 Elsewhere the Qur'an states: "You
were the best nation sent to people [because you] enjoin the good and
forbid the bad."8 The duty to enjoin the good and forbid the bad is
both individual and collective. It is incumbent upon every individual,
man and woman, and it is imperative that the Muslim nation as a
whole discharge the same obligation. Integral to this process is a duty
of mutual consultation (shura). The Qur'an describes those who are
rightly guided as those "[w]ho obey the commands of their Lord,
fulfill their devotional obligations and whose affairs are settled by
mutual consultation."9
What is "good" or "bad" is held individually and subjectively.
But through the discoursive process of consultation a consensus is
reached on collective notions of the good and the bad. However the
J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 36-73, 86-119 (1964).
7. QUR'AN, supra note 2, at 9:112.
8. Id at 3:109.
9. Id at 42".38 (emphasis added).

6. See NOEL
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consultative process does not end here. Since the Qur'an insists on
individual accountability,'0 each person must continuously engage in
a conscious and reflective process of discovering the divine will.
Consequently, the discoursive consultative process of enjoining the
good and forbidding the bad continues within society in a dynamic
process of new consensus building. As long as the divine will is
attainable only through individual subjective comprehensions, and as
long as individual subjective comprehensions continue to shift and
develop, the discoursive consultative process must continue to search
for new grounds for consensus building.
Muslim publicists had assumed that the consensus-building
process would take place in daral-Islam (the lands of Islam), and that
the government would be organized according to the principles of alkhilafa or imama (Islamic government). What exactly defines dar alIslam and what are the organizing principles of Islamic government
are hotly contested issues in Islamic history. The vast majority of
Muslim publicists, however, insisted that the primary duties of an
Islamic government were enforcing the Sharia and maintaining
security and order. As Islamic history testifies, these two obligations
often existed in a state of tension. In order to achieve stability and
order it is, at times, not possible to indulge the substantial restrictions
of Sharia law. More importantly, however, which Sharia-based
comprehensive view must the state enforce? And how does an
Islamic state give institutional force to the process of discourse and
consensus building? The responses to these interrelated questions are
complex. Furthermore, Islamic historical practices in these areas have
been varied and diverse.
For the purposes of this Essay, it is sufficient to note that
although Muslim publicists have often argued that the Islamic state
must enforce the Sharia, they have not conceded the power of
definition to the state. In other words, they have not recognized the
state's power to define the one authentic Sharia-based comprehensive
view. The overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists have insisted that
the jurists of Islam should retain the power of definition. Significantly, through Islamic history no single Sharia-based comprehensive view
has emerged as a clear winner to the exclusion of others. Any
researcher in Islamic law and theology is struck by the amount of
diversity, debate, and disagreement on many essential points.

10. Id at 2:281, 14:51, 52:21, 74:38.
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Nonetheless, this historical richness might be on its way to being
reversed in the contemporary age.
Islamic discourse, being fundamentally a religious discourse, runs
two distinct risks. For one, it excludes comprehensive views not based
on an interpretation of the divine will from the consensus-building
process. This is especially the case in relation to non-Muslims. Even
if non-Muslim comprehensive views are based on interpretations of
the divine will, that they are not Islamic renders them problematic.
Generally, the premodern solution to this problem was to create
segregated legal jurisdictions. Muslims were to be governed by their
own laws and Christians and Jews, called the People of the Book, as
well as some other minorities, were to be governed by their own laws.
In a sense, Muslims would have their own discourses and non-Muslim
discourses occupied their own space, separate and apart from Muslim
discourses. One does not want to overstate the case, however,
because Islamic history is replete with examples of cooperation and
integration between Muslims and non-Muslims. But, at least
theoretically, non-Muslims had their own laws, courts, and jurisdictions. We will return to this point later in the Essay.
The second problem arises when one Islamic comprehensive view
attempts to preempt and exclude all other Islamic comprehensive
views. Alternatively, a consensus reached at one historical point
might attempt to preempt any further consultation and consensus
building. Arguably, if one firmly believes that he or she has correctly
understood the divine will, he or she might refuse to engage in any
further discourse and might attempt to impose his or her comprehensive view on all others. This scenario has taken place several times,
with varying degrees of success and failure, in Islamic history. Today,
the Wahabis and a variety of Islamic movements seem intent on
preempting and excluding all other Sharia-basedcomprehensive views.
Furthermore, the religious discourse might become so polarized and
divisive that it is not conducive to any form of consensus building.
This has taken place several times in Islamic history, most notably
between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites.
Whatever the problems may be, the Sharia and the discourse on
the Sharia are at the core of Islam. The Sharia binds and obligates
all Muslims wherever they may reside. A Muslim living in a land not
dedicated to a discourse on the Sharia and not committed to applying
any Sharia-based comprehensive view creates an intricate problem.
What if the state considers Sharia discourses irrelevant or even
unhelpful in the public realm? It must be emphasized that this

1530
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problem could arise in Muslim or non-Muslim territory. For example,
it is possible that a government ruling over a largely Muslim
population would be hostile to all Sharia discourses. This situation
exists in many Muslim countries today, partly accounting for the
tumultuous nature of the politics surrounding Islamic movements.
For purposes of this Essay, we will not focus on the problem as
it relates to Muslims living in countries with Muslim majorities. Our
focus is on Muslims who live in non-Muslim territories, particularly
those who live in pluralist liberal democracies such as the United
States.
In a secular liberal democracy, the state may not enforce a
religious comprehensive view. In the United States, the government
may not establish any religion. To state the obvious, the state may
not decide to establish Sharia law as the law of the land or adopt
Islam as the religion of the state. Kent Greenawalt and other scholars
have argued that religious and other comprehensive views are
inaccessible to the public at large. Public officials and private citizens
should exercise a degree of self-restraint in public discourses. Public
officials and private citizens entering the public realm should refrain
from making inaccessible arguments which rely on religious or other
comprehensive views.
Furthermore, Greenawalt differentiates
between the amount of self-restraint that executives, legislators,
judicial officials, and private citizens must exercise. The judiciary
must exercise the most self-restraint, followed by the executive. As
to legislators and private citizens, Greenawalt seems to advocate a
kind of balancing act with a presumption in favor of self-restraint.
Legislators must exercise greater self-restraint than private citizens.
But on certain crucial unsettled public issues or outrageous public
policies, legislators may explicitly bring comprehensive views, religious
or otherwise, to bear." Greenawalt does not advocate an unequivocal and complete exclusion of religious comprehensive views from all
public discourses.
If a Muslim decides to reside in or become the citizen of a
secular liberal democracy, what becomes of the obligation to live
according to a Sharia-based comprehensive view? To put it more
directly, what becomes of the obligation to obey God's divine law?

11. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 158-64

(1995).
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How is a Muslim to discharge the discoursive obligation of enjoining
the good and forbidding the bad?
Some non-Muslim writers have argued that these questions
present Muslims with irresolvable dilemmas.' In fact, some writers
claim that Islamic communities pose a major threat to the stability of
Europe.13 In the words of one writer:
The religious freedoms in the West are a source of trouble.
Islam is a communal way of life and the vast majority of
emigrants and their European-born children live together
isolated from, and hostile to, the society around them. The
separation of Church and State contradicts and conflicts with
the tenets of Islam, hence is a constant source of tension.
The Muslim communities demand to be allowed to retain all
aspects of Islam, including laws of Urf(a traditional Arabian
law that has been absorbed into the Islamic order and legal
system), some of which may be unacceptable in the West.
They also seek the imposition of Islamic law, seeing it as
superior to the civil law of the land that is secular, liberal,
and based Judeo-Christian values. [sic] For believers, the
mere acceptance of Western law means a contradiction of
Islam's tenet that the Sharia is the world's supreme law. 4
There is an obvious tone of paranoia and hostility to Muslim
communities in this quote. Nonetheless, from this quote one can
make three observations that will be addressed later in this Essay.
First, a tension exists between the obligation to obey the Sharia and
the obligation to obey some of the laws that may exist in a secular
liberal democracy. Second, this quote claims that liberal democracies
are based on Judeo-Christian values. This claim, casually made by
several observers, is, for many Muslims, believed to be a
nonaccessible and exclusionary view. In response, several Muslims
have insisted that Western civilization is based on Judeo-Christian-

12. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Legal Debates on Muslim Minorities,22 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 127, 128 (1994).
13. YOSSEF BODANSKY, TARGET AMERICA & THE WEST 256 (1993). This quote was

originally part of an unpublished report entitled "Iran's European Springboard?" issued
September 1, 1992 by the House Republican Research Committee's Task Force on
Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. Bodansky was the Director of the Republican

Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare of the U.S. Congress.
14. Id. at 257-58.
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Muslim values. Third, Islam and Muslims
in the West generate
15
suspicion and hostility in some quarters.
The Sharia itself does not clearly resolve the issue of Muslim
residence in non-Muslim lands. As noted above, the word Sharia is
an inclusive term. It includes the Qur'an,the Sunna, and the general
principles and specific rules deduced by Muslim jurists. The Qur'an
and Sunna are inconclusive on this matter. The Qur'an commands
the oppressed to escape oppression by migrating to other lands. It
states:
As for those whose souls are taken by the angels [at death]
while in a state of injustice against themselves, they will be
asked by the angels: 'What state were you in?' They will
answer: 'We were oppressed in the land.' And the angels
will say: 'Was not God's earth large enough for you to
migrate?' ....

Whosoever migrates in the cause of God will

16
find many places of refuge and abundance.
These Qur'anic verses contain several ambiguities. What is "a
state of injustice against oneself"'? What is oppression? And to
where should one migrate? Nevertheless, the reference to "God's
earth being large enough" implies that migration could be to any land
in which one can escape oppression. The earth was not Muslim when
these verses were revealed and remains as such. But if one escapes to
lands that are not Muslim, what becomes of the obligation to live by
God's commands?
The Sunna is equally inconclusive. Some reports, attributed to
the Prophet, forbid Muslims from residing in non-Muslim territories.

Other reports contradict this injunction.17

Significantly, Muslim historical practices and juridical opinions
reflect the same complexity. Muslims have resided in non-Muslim
territories since the second/eighth century and today about one-third
of all Muslims live in non-Muslim lands. Muslim jurists have
expressed a variety of positions on the legality of Muslims residing in
non-Muslim lands.
15. See, ag., Daniel Pipes, Fundamental Questions About Muslims, WALL ST. J., Oct.
30, 1992, at All; Daniel Pipes, The Muslims Are Comingl The Muslims Are Comingl,
NAT'L REv., Nov. 19, 1990, at 28; Elaine Sciolino, The Red Menace is Gone. But Here's
Islam, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1996, at 1.
16. QUR'AN, supra note 2, at 4:97-100.
17. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic

Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth
Centuries, 1 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'y 141, 141-44 (1994).
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The majority of Maliki jurists maintained that it is illegal for
Muslims to reside in non-Muslim territories. Muslims, they argue,
should always reside in territories where Sharialaw either is supreme
or could be supreme; Complex historical reasons account for this
unequivocal position, but they are not relevant for the purposes of
this Essay.
Hanbali and Shi'ite jurists argue that it is preferable that Muslims
reside in Muslim territory. Nonetheless, if Muslims are able to
practice their religion freely or, as these jurists often explain it, if they
are able to "manifest Islam," they may reside in non-Muslim territory.
Hanafi and Shafi'i jurists concur that all things being equal, it is
preferable that Muslims reside in Muslim lands. But if Muslims are
able to manifest their religion, they may reside in non-Muslim lands.
If Muslims are able to manifest their religion and openly advocate
Islam, it is recommended that they continue residing among nonMuslims. Shafi'i jurists go further, arguing that if Muslims are able to
maintain a degree of autonomy and self-protection, it is their
obligation to continue residing in non-Muslim territory'
Other jurists, from a variety of legal schools, have argued that
regardless of whether a territory is Muslim or non-Muslim, Muslims
must migrate from territories in which they feel insecure, where there
is widespread corruption, or in which injustice prevails. Other jurists
argue that Muslims may only live where they can freely enjoin the
good and forbid the bad. Whether the territory is formally Muslim
or non-Muslim is immaterial. 19
The question at this point is how much of Islam must be
"manifested" before residence in non-Muslim territory becomes legal?
Alternatively, how much injustice or oppression must be suffered in
the lands of Islam before it becomes legal to migrate to non-Muslim
territories? Finally, how much freedom to enjoin the good and forbid
the bad must be awarded before the residence can become legal?
Bernard Lewis argued that since Muslims allowed non-Muslims to
retain their own laws, Muslims expected reciprocity-a degree of
communal autonomy in which they could apply their own laws.2

18. Id. at 143-64.
19. See id. at 152-53.
20. Bernard Lewis, Legal and Historical Reflections on the Position of Muslim

Populations Under Non-Muslim Rule, in ISLAM

AND THE WEST

53-55 (1993).
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However the historical and doctrinal sources do not support this
conclusion.2 '
It is unclear how much of Islam had to be manifested before
residence in non-Muslim territory could be considered legal. In
responsa (fatawa) literature, Muslim jurists have argued that even if
Muslims are not able to fully discharge Sharia obligations they do not
have to migrate from non-Muslim territory. Furthermore, the Hanafi
school has argued that the public laws of Islam-commercial, civil,
and criminal laws-are not applicable in non-Muslim territories. The
other Islamic schools maintained that while the laws of Shariamorally
bind Muslims wherever they may reside, these laws may not be
enforced in non-Muslim territory. These schools argued that if a
Muslim violates the law of Sharia he or she incurs a sin. However,
the sinner may not be prosecuted for the violation unless he or she
enters Muslim territory.'
Fundamentally, the ambiguity of Muslim discourses on the issue
of manifesting Islam points out the fact that it is impossible to set
precise standards in this area. Muslim minorities encounter a variety
of specific circumstances and contexts. Any strict standard enunciated
is bound to be ineffectual. Muslim minorities, within the bounds of
general principles, must be allowed to work out context-specific
compromises.
Muslim jurists assumed that Muslims residing in or entering nonMuslim territories would do so under an agreement of aman (safe
conduct). The agreement would specify the rights and duties of the
Muslim population. If an explicit agreement did not exist, Islamic law
considered an agreement implied by law. Under an implied by law
agreement, a Muslim may not commit hostile acts against the host
state and may not commit acts of treachery, deceit, fraud, betrayal, or
usurpation. In all other circumstances, a Muslim is strictly bound by
the terms of the aman agreement. A violation of an explicit or
implied agreement could be prosecuted in Muslim territory.'
At one level, the discussion above might propose a solution to
the issue of Muslims in a liberal democracy. A Muslim in the United
States whether a visitor, resident, or citizen signs application papers
promising to obey the laws of the United States. This procedure
might be considered an aman agreement. Therefore, while a Muslim
21. See El Fadl, supra note 17, at 158-59.
22. Id at 172-81.

23. Id at 175-77.
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is ethically bound by Sharia law, Sharia law itself obligates a Muslim
to observe the terms of the aman agreement. According to this
argument, a Muslim is separate and apart from the non-Muslim
society in which he or she lives and maintains a special status through
a specific contractual relationship with the non-Muslim society.
Meanwhile, it could be argued that a Muslim, through involvement in
the public sphere, might attempt to negotiate concessions to his or her
desire to implement his or her Sharia-basedcomprehensive view. In
other words, a Muslim does not become involved in the public sphere
as an insider but as an outsider enjoying a special relationship trying
to negotiate special privileges. As to native-born Muslims, arguably
the mere fact of citizenship implies an aman agreement and, hence,
the same logic pertains.
Although some Muslim activists espouse this view, it poses
certain difficulties. According to this view, Muslims are involved in
the political process for the sole purpose of obtaining concessions for
their Sharia-based comprehensive view. For example, they might
argue for the application of Muslim family law or personal law to
Muslims living in the United States or Europe. Obviously, in the
United States this type of scenario would pose insurmountable
problems for the separation of church and state doctrine and
establishment clause jurisprudence. But more fundamentally, since
this view limits Muslim participation in the political process to
advocating their own Sharia-basedcomprehensive views, it effectively
excludes Muslims from occupying public functions, particularly
executory and judicial functions. According to this view, Muslims
would effectively limit themselves to advocating inaccessible comprehensive views. Their sole goal would be to implement Muslim law
exclusively. This leaves Muslims practically no space in executory or
judicial functions. Even more, unless a Muslim represents an
exclusively Muslim constituency, this view also excludes Muslims from
legislative functions.
Essentially, this view advocates self-exclusion from all accessible
public issues. Muslims would self-exclude themselves from participating in any public issue unless it relates to their aman contract or to
their ability to apply the Sharia. Several Muslim activists have argued
that this view is isolationist, insular, and that it conflicts with their
understanding of the duty to enjoin the good and forbid the bad.
Self-exclusion in the public sphere and limiting oneself to what might
be called Sharia issues, these activists argue, renders the duty to
enjoin the good and forbid the bad to that of enjoining what is good
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for Muslims and forbidding what is bad for Muslims. Islamic doctrinal
sources do not warrant this restrictive view of the duty to enjoin the
good and forbid the bad.
Other Muslim scholars have argued that the Shariaimposes upon
Muslims a primary duty to protect the general welfare. Muslims must
never permit themselves to become powerless, and they must, under
all circumstances, be in a position to safeguard their own interests
(masalih).24 The necessity of protecting the welfare of Muslims must
be at the cornerstone of any Sharia-based comprehensive view.'
Consequently, Shariaobligations are altered and reformulated in light
of context-specific circumstances and needs. 26 If Muslims adopt an
isolationist and insular stance, the argument continues, they are bound
to become powerless. As noted above, there are writers who regard
Muslim communities with much suspicion if not outright hostility.
Because of the lack of familiarity with Islam and, at times hostility
towards Muslims, the isolationist stance is contrary to the welfare of
Muslims. Hence, the Shariaimposes a duty upon Muslims to become
involved in the political process in order to safeguard their interests.
Admittedly, I find the enjoining-the-good-and-forbidding-the-bad
argument and the protection-of-interests argument somewhat vague
and of limited persuasiveness. As justifications for Muslim involvement in the public sphere, they are useful but incomplete. These
arguments explain why Muslims must not adopt an isolationist and
insular stance, but they do not elucidate the form that Muslim
involvement in the political process should take. It is unclear whether
according to these arguments Muslims should only be concerned
about public issues that directly affect Muslim interests. Additionally,
even if one would adopt an expansive view of these arguments, it is
not clear how Muslims should articulate their concerns in the public
sphere. If a Muslim, while involved in the public sphere, bases
himself or herself on a Sharia-based comprehensive view, this view
will necessarily be exclusionary and inaccessible to non-Muslims.
Arguably Muslim private citizens may appropriately advocate any
comprehensive view they deem necessary in the public sphere. But

24. Id at 180. There are several legal maxims such as "hardship begets facility" or
"necessities permit the forbidden" which are often cited in support of this argument. See
MAHMASSANI, supra note 3, at 152-59.
25. For views on public welfare or interests and Sharia,see MAHMASSANI, supra note

3, at 87-89, 116-17.
26. See id at 105-19 (discussing changes in Islamic law).
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those arguments do not clarify whether the same behavior is
appropriate in the case of Muslims occupying official public positions.
I think the real issue is whether Muslims, despite their Shariabased comprehensive views, can participate in a pluralist cooperative
venture with non-Muslims in order to produce justice. Is it possible to
find commonly accessible grounds on which to discuss public issues,
with the goal of finding solutions that are fair to all?
In preparation for this Essay I posed several questions to
Muslims, all of whom are United States citizens.2 7 I asked the
participants if they considered it offensive if a judge in justifying a
legal decision cites Christian values, Judeo-Christian values, Jesus
Christ, or "our Christian traditions." All of the participants said that
they would consider this offensive. I posed the same hypothetical but
involving an executive-the president, a justice department official, or
the secretary of education. Most of the participants stated that they
would also deem this offensive.O In relation to the legislature, there
seemed to be some distinction as to whether the reference occurs in
a preamble to a statute or in floor debates. The vast majority of the
participants said that they would be offended by the above-mentioned
references if they occurred in a preamble to a statute. 9 The
majority of the participants stated that these references by a legislator
in floor debates would be offensive as well." I asked the participants if they would think it is inappropriate for private citizens to
make the same references when testifying before Congress, writing an
article in a newspaper, or writing a letter to the president. Three
participants said that they would deem it inappropriate and three
were unsure. The responses of the remaining participants ranged
from "it's okay" to "it's their right."'"

27. I conducted interviews between January 15 and 26,1996, with 26 participants from
Texas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, California, New York, Florida, Arizona, and
Indiana. Five participants identified themselves as politically active, three said that they
do not follow political events, and the rest said that they consider themselves politically

aware.
28. Two participants stated that a reference to Judeo-Christian values is not offensive.
2 9. One participant said that a reference to Judeo-Christian values is not offensive.
30. Three participants said that they would not be offended, but two of them added
that they would not vote for that legislator.
31. I asked the participants if they think it is appropriate for a Muslim judge to start
his opinion by stating, "In the name of God the all Merciful, the all Compassionate." This
is a well-known Muslim phrase pronounced before commencing any act. Ironically, eight
participants said that this is appropriate.
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Of course, this is not a scientific survey and one must be very
cautious as to the conclusions that could be drawn. But it does seem
that the reason most of the participants objected to Christian or
Jewish references by the judiciary, executive, or legislative branches
is that these references are not accessible to Muslims. The psychological impact of these references is to exclude Muslims. Phrasing
judicial, executory, or legislative decisions or arguments in
nonaccessible or exclusionary terms creates what Greenawalt calls a
"perceived unfairness."32
The responses of the participants seem to indicate a belief that,
as citizens, the political process should take their sensitivities into
account-that the political discourse should be phrased in terms that
are accessible to them. The logical point that follows is one of
reciprocity. If Muslim citizens demand access to political discourse
and process, it necessarily follows that as participants in the political
process, they must allow the political process to be accessible to
others. Consequently, as participants in the political process a degree
of self-restraint is necessary to justify decisions and arguments on
equally accessible grounds.
We noted earlier that Muslim historical practices allowed a
relationship of reciprocity-Christians and Jews implemented their
own laws while Muslims retained their laws. Each comprehensive
view was adhered to and applied by its adherents. In a liberal
democracy, the state differentiates between a political perspective,
which is accessible and nonexclusive, and a comprehensive perspective, which is nonaccessible and exclusionary. The liberal democratic
state refrains from adopting a comprehensive view leaving the
political realm open to all. If non-Muslims promise to refrain from
forcing their comprehensive views upon Muslims, reciprocally,
Muslims should refrain from forcing their comprehensive views upon
others.
This relationship of reciprocity is particularly applicable to
Muslims functioning as public officials. As a public official, a citizen
represents the political process, not an individual comprehensive view.
Most of the participants in our questionnaire distinguished between
public officials invoking nonaccessible grounds and advocacy on the
basis of nonaccessible grounds by private citizens. I suspect that most
Muslims in the United States would argue that it is entirely appropri-

32. GREENAWALT, supra note 11, at 24.
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ate for private citizens to advocate their own comprehensive views in
the political process. My own inclination is that if social and political
discourses are to avoid polarization, a degree of self-restraint is
necessary. I would argue that as a discrete and often discriminated
against minority, Muslims are better off in a nonpolarized society.
Although one must be careful, if one insists that all public issues be
discussed from political perspectives, rather than comprehensive
perspectives, there is a risk that pluralism in society would suffer.
Everything said so far pertains to the issue of how Muslims
should conduct themselves in the political process. If Muslims
become involved in the political process, they should respect a rule of
reciprocity which, in turn, requires self-restraint. However, considering that at least some Muslims base their lives on a Sharia-based
comprehensive view, should they become involved in the political
process in the first place? The two views discussed above-the
enjoining-the-good-and-forbidding-the-bad
argument and the
protection-of-interests argument-are designed to provide responses
to this problem. However, I would like to draw attention to an
additional significant fact.
The majority of Muslim jurists who permitted Muslims to reside
in non-Muslim territory also argued that Muslims may serve as public
officials. The only restriction is that they may not commit acts
directly detrimental to the interests of other Muslims. Additionally,
they may not commit infractions against the religious laws of Islam
such as lying, cheating, drinking alcohol, eating pork, or having
extramarital sex. These jurists did not demand that Muslim public
officials working in non-Muslim territories implement the Islamic
public laws such as commercial and criminal regulations.
Shi'ite jurists addressed a closely related scenario. They
discussed whether Shi'ites may serve as judges or other public officials
in Sunni territories. In these positions Shi'ites may have to implement
Sunni laws and observe Sunni regulations. Shi'ite jurists stated that
a Shi'ite may do so as long as he or she does not vouch for the
correctness of the law being implemented. In all circumstances, a
Shi'ite is under an obligation to use discretion to implement justice.
On issues on which a Shi'ite has no discretion, a Shi'ite performs the
official task without personally adopting the Sunni comprehensive
view. On issues which allow discretion, a Shi'ite is obligated to
implement personal notions of justice. The difficulty confronted here
is that this discourse addresses the involvement of a Shi'ite in a polity
that is not neutral towards all comprehensive views. Rather the
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Shi'ite is functioning in a polity which actively and openly espouses
a Sunni comprehensive view-a comprehensive view which is
antithetical to Shi'ite comprehensive views.
This dynamic is less problematic in a secular liberal democracy.
Here, the system does not adopt a comprehensive view and, in theory,
should not be hostile to any comprehensive view. The pluralist reality
of the state forces it to be neutral towards all comprehensive views.
A Muslim public official represents this pluralist reality and, therefore,
must base policies and decisions on grounds that are accessible to all.
For example, a Muslim who happens to adhere to a Sharia-based
comprehensive view, may accept a position as a judge in a liberal
democracy. The judge is confronted with a case in which the death
penalty is at issue. The judge becomes persuaded that pursuant to the
law of the state a death sentence is warranted but pursuant to his or
her Sharia view a death sentence is not warranted. It is not appropriate for the judge to rule according to his or her Sharia-based
comprehensive view. But what if the judge encounters a case in
which the law of the state is ambiguous? If the law of the state is
equivocal on whether a death sentence is warranted, may the Muslim
judge, at this point, adjudicate in accordance with a personal
comprehensive view? The Shi'ite position would seem to hold that
this is a situation in which the judge may exercise discretion in
accordance with the judge's own comprehensive view. I believe that
in a liberal democracy the Shi'ite view would be indefensible. Even
if the judge has discretion, that discretion must be exercised on
grounds that are accessible to all, especially the defendant in the case.
The judge must make every effort to reason and explain that
reasoning in accessible terms. Reversing the scenario, assuming that
the defendant is Muslim and the judge holds a comprehensive
Christian view, I doubt very much if the Muslim defendant would
think it fair that the judge used his or her discretion in accordance
with Christian values.
In the Muslim community, there are two commonly heard
objections to the argument in favor of excluding religious comprehensive views from public functions. First, in reality this is a JudeoChristian culture. The political system, far from being neutral, is
based on the comprehensive views of Judeo-Christian values. The
arguments in favor of accessible political grounds are nothing more
than a guise for excluding other comprehensive views from influencing
the political system or altering the already dominant comprehensive
view. Second, insistence on self-restraint or self-exclusion in the
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public realm will lead to an immoral and valueless society. When
public discourses become value neutral they quickly descend to a
position lacking values. Both objections are rather popular in the
Muslim community.
As to the first objection, I have to admit that I find the claim,
often made by politicians, that the values of a liberal democracy are
based on a Judeo-Christian tradition incomprehensible.33 But even
if one accepts this position, it implies that Muslims should be allowed
to implement their own system based on their own comprehensive
views. In other words, if one believes that the present system is
fundamentally Judeo-Christian, the reciprocal argument is that
Muslims should be allowed to live under a system that is fundamentally Muslim. It is not an argument against self-restraint; it is an
argument for separation. It is not an argument that enables a Muslim
to work within the system; rather, it requires a Muslim to opt out of
the system altogether. Take for example the situation of the Muslim
judge mentioned above. That Muslim judge, upon taking office, takes
an oath promising to uphold the law-a law supposedly based on the
Judeo-Christian tradition. A judge who adjudicates cases according
to a personal Islamic comprehensive view violates that oath. In
Islamic terms, the judge violated the terms of his or her aman.
According to the Sharia,he or she cannot take an oath he or she does
not intend to keep. Consequently, if the Muslim judge believes that
the law of the state is Judeo-Christian, he or she must self-exclude
himself or herself from any official position. One might argue that
according to the Shi'ite view discussed above, the Muslim judge can
implement Judeo-Christian law except in cases in which he or she has
discretion. But the law of aman has no application between Shi'ites
and Sunnis; consequently, it is an entirely different relationship.
According to the law of aman, the Muslim judge cannot use discretion
to implement a Sharia-basedcomprehensive view unless the contract
of aman specifically permits it.
The second objection is more formidable. The political system
in a liberal democracy is not valueless; it is value specific. The
primary values are accessibility, inclusion, and equal respect.
Individuals in society can and should adhere to their own values
resulting from their own comprehensive views. When the state

33. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Openingof the American Mind,N.Y. TIMES BOOK
REv., July 23, 1989, at 26.
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outlaws polygamy, or imposes the death sentence, or allows credit
cards to collect twenty percent interest rates on debts, the state
necessarily offends the comprehensive views of some and possibly
even most of its citizens. The theory of liberal democracy requires
public officials to justify these policies on accessible grounds. Citizens
may seek to change these laws because they might believe that they
are fundamentally immoral. If they succeed in changing these laws,
the state, again, must justify the change in the law on accessible
grounds. Liberal democracy theory advocates accessibility, not
immorality. I do not believe accessibility must necessarily lead to
immorality. The objection as articulated by some members of the
Muslim community protests the state's failure to preach morality.
However, what if the morality preached by the state excludes Muslims
or even discriminates against Muslims? To argue that the remedy is
for Muslims to engage the political process and change this fact
assumes that minorities have an equal power to convince and
persuade, an unrealistic assumption.
In conclusion, Muslims in the United States are far from attaining
a consensus on the terms of conduct or debate in a liberal democracy.
Muslim doctrinal sources provide several competing values to consider
and weigh. Different Muslims could resolve the inherent conflicts and
tensions differently. I have argued that an ethic of self-restraint in
public discourse and acts affords the Muslim minority in the United
States the most protection. The recent hysteria concerning Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism proves that Muslims are well-advised
to seek a system that affords them the greatest protection. But a rule
of reciprocity requires that Muslims exercise the same self-restraint in
discharging public duties and phrasing public discourses.
There is no single Sharia-basedcomprehensive view. Throughout
Islamic history there have been a variety of Islamic comprehensive
views. Muslims have a rich history of discourse between the various
Sharia-based comprehensive views in which self-restraint and
consensus building were practiced. Muslims in the United States are
well-advised to develop their own tradition of self-restraint, equal
respect, and consensus building and, of course, non-Muslims owe
them the same duties.

